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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE . The debtor had granted a security interest
to one creditor in the debtor’s farm products, which included
soybean and corn crops. The debtor had given the creditor a
list, containing one name, of the possible buyers of the grain.
However, the debtor encountered financial difficulties and
sold the soybeans to a different buyer and used the proceeds
to pay other creditors and for living expenses, without first
obtaining the consent of the creditor. The debtor also had no
money to purchase feed for the debtor’s feeder pigs and used
the corn crop as feed for the pigs. The pigs could not be sold
because the market price was too low. Again, the debtor did
not obtain the creditor’s consent for use of the corn as feed.
The creditor sought to have the loan declared
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(6) for willful and
malicious injury. The court discussed Kawaauhau v. Geiger,
523 U.S. 57 (1998), which used the standard that requires that
the debtor intentionally inflict the injury, not that the debtor
only intentionally commit an act which leads to the injury. In
the current case, the court stated that the issue was what was
the injury when a debtor converts collateral without consent.
The court held that the injury in such cases was the
conversion itself, not the resulting loss of collateral;
therefore, the court held that the debtor intentionally caused
the injury because the evidence demonstrated that the debtor
intentionally sold the soybeans and fed the corn to the pigs.
As to the second element of Section 523(a)(6), the court
defined malicious as a conscious disregard of the creditor’s
rights. The court noted that the debtor was fully aware of the
security interest and that the sale and use of the grain violated
the security agreement; therefore, the court held that the
debtor maliciously injured the creditor and the loan was
nondischargeable. The court noted that the debtor had
meaningful reasons and good intentions for using the
collateral, in hopes that an improvement in the price of feeder
pigs would provide sufficient money to pay all debts.
However, the court stated that the debtor’s failure to even
consult with the creditor before converting the grain
demonstrated the debtor’s lack of good faith. In re Russell,
262 B.R. 449 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2001).
ESTATE PROPERTY . The debtor owned interests in
several employee pension plans and was receiving monthly
annuity distributions when the debtor filed for Chapter 13.
The IRS filed a claim for taxes which exceeded the value of
the debtor’s property, excluding the annuity payments. Tax
liens had been filed pre-petition and the issue was whether
the pension plan payments were included in bankruptcy
estate property so as to be considered as part of the property
securing the IRS claim. The pension plans had clauses
restricting assignment or attachment of the plan distributions
or principal. The Bankruptcy Court had held that the pension
plan payments were not estate property under state law
because of the spendthrift clauses; therefore, the annuity
payments did not secure the tax claims. However, the
Bankruptcy Court had held that the tax liens would survive
th  bankruptcy and remain attached to the annuity payments.
The District Court reversed and held that because the pension
plan payments were subject to the tax liens, the plan
restrictions were not effective under nonbankruptcy law;
th refore, the pension plan payments were included in estate
property. The District Court held that the present value of the
monthly payments was part of the security for the tax claim.
On remand, the Bankruptcy Court noted the contrary
authority for the District Court’s holding but, in adhering to
the law of the case, held that the tax claims were fully
s cure . In re McIver, 262 B.R. 362 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001),
on rem. from, 255 B.R. 281 (D. MD. 2000).
EXEMPTIONS
CHILD TAX CREDIT. The debtors’ Chapter 13 plan
required the debtors to turn over to the trustee all income tax
refunds. The debtors sought to exclude the turnover of a tax
refund to the extent the refund was created by the federal
child tax credit (FCTC). The debtors argued that the credit
was exempt under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 205.220(3) as a public
assistance payment. The court followed In re Dever, 250 B.R.
701 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) which held that the FCTC was
not intended as public assistance for low-income families
because the credit was available for middle and upper level
income families; therefore, the FCTC did not qualify for the
public assistance exemption and had to be turned over to the
trustee. In re Beltz, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,543
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . Several years before filing for bankruptcy,
the debtor had transferred most of the debtor’s personal
property and some real property to a trust for the benefit of
the debtor’s children. The property consisted of some farm
equipment and farmland, with the remainder mostly
household furnishings. The debtor continued to use the
property as the debtor’s own. A few more pieces of property
were contributed to the trust over the years. After the debtor
filed for bankruptcy, the debtor failed to include the property
in the trust which was in the debtor’s possession. At the
creditors’ meeting, the debtor again failed to reveal the trust
and made several erroneous statements about the ownership
of the property. The IRS filed a motion to deny the debtor a
discharge under Section 727(a)(2)(A) for concealment of
assets nd under Section 727(a)(4)(A) for falsely filling out
the bankruptcy schedules. The court noted that Section
727(a)(2)(A) requires that the concealment occur within one
year before the petition but held that where the debtor has
continued to treat the property as the debtor’s, the transfer to
the trust was a continuing concealment which carried over to
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the one year period before the petition. The court held that
the debtor would be denied a discharge under Section
727(a)(2)(A). The court also noted that the debtor even
attempted to conceal the concealment by not listing the
property on the bankruptcy schedules as in the debtor’s
possession. The court also held that discharge would be
denied under Section 727(a)(4)(A) because of the many false
statements made on the schedules and at the creditors’
meeting. In re Korte, 262 B.R. 464 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 2001).
The debtor had failed to file returns or pay taxes for seven
tax years. For the first five years, the IRS made assessments
based solely on substitute returns created by the IRS. For the
last two years, the debtor filed returns after the IRS had made
assessments and the debtor had filed an appeal with the Tax
Court. During the assessments, the debtor responded to the
IRS by raising several tax protestor arguments and the debtor
raised the same arguments against the IRS claims in the
bankruptcy case. The court held that the debtor’s failure to
file returns and pay the taxes was a willful attempt to evade
the payment of taxes and made the tax claims
nondischargeable. In re Wilbert, 262 B.R. 571 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2001).
The debtor had failed to file returns and pay taxes for
several tax years. The debtor’s reason was that the debtor’s
employment changed to that of an independent contractor and
the debtor was confused by the need to file estimated taxes.
The IRS created substitute returns and filed assessments
against the debtor. The debtor then filed late returns which
were almost identical to the returns created by the IRS. The
IRS sought to have the taxes declared nondischargeable for
failure to file a return. The court held that once a substitute
return is created, a taxpayer’s return will not qualify as a
return for Section 523 purposes unless the return provides
complete and detailed information which gives a more
accurate calculation of the taxes owed. Because the debtor’s
returns were mere copies of the IRS substitute returns, the
debtor’s returns were disregarded and the taxes were
nondischargeable. In re Hetzler, 262 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D.
N.J. 2001).
CONTRACTS
FORMATION. The defendant, a pig producer, and the
plaintiff a pig seller negotiated for a contract to sell
segregated early-weaned pigs to the defendant. The plaintiff
sent a written contract to the defendant setting forth various
terms of the sale, including a price, number of pigs to be
purchased and the term of the contract. The  defendant
returned the contract unsigned and with several changes,
most notably, the number of pigs to be purchased and a
definition affecting termination of the contract. The
defendant reviewed another version of the contract, reinstated
the defendant’s original changes and signed the contract. The
reviewed copy was not signed by the plaintiff. The defendant
made a purchase of pigs from the plaintiff but the parties
agreed that the purchase was not made under the contract.
The defendant received another version of the contract which
was signed by the plaintiff but which did not contain the
changes made by the defendant. This version was not signed
by the defendant. The plaintiff attempted to sell some pigs to
the defendant under the contract terms but the defendant
refused, stating that no contract existed. The defendant did
make several pig purchases from the defendant but at other
quan ities and prices than provided in the contract. The
plaintiff produced at trial a document which purported to
have both parties’ signatures but actually contained only a
copy of the defendant’s signature. The court held that no
contract existed because the parties intended that a contract
had to have both signatures and both parties never signed an
unchanged contract version. The court noted that the parties’
actions during and after the contract negotiations were
consistent with the lack of an agreement. Flanagan v.




CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE. The IRS has adopted as
final a egulation which allows the IRS to disclose return
information to the Department of Agriculture for purposes of




GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS. The IRS has
provided guidance regarding requests for an extension of
time to make an allocation of generation-skipping transfer
exemption under I.R.C. §§ 2642(b)(1), (2) in view of the
enactment of I.R.C. § 2642(g) by EGTRRA 2001. The notice
also provides guidance regarding requests for an extension of
time to make elections under I.R.C. §§ 2632(b)(3),
2632(c)(5) as added by § 561(a) of the Act. Notice 2001-50,
I.R.B. 2001-__.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX . The
decedent owned interests in two trusts received from a
predeceased spouse, one of which was QTIP. The trusts
owned and operated a closely-held business and the
decedent’s estate elected to pay the estate tax in installments.
Upon the decedent’s death the trusts passed to two heirs who
were the co-trustees. The trusts transferred the corpus to a
limited liability company in exchange for membership
interests in the LLC. The trustees then distributed the LLC
interests to themselves. The IRS ruled that the transfers did
not cause acceleration of the installment payment of estate
tax because the transfers were mere changes in the form of
owning the business. Ltr. Rul. 200129018, April 18, 2001.
RETURNS. The IRS has adopted as final regulations on
the procedure for filing for an automatic six month extension
to file Form 706. The extension request is made on Form
4768 and must include an estimate of the taxes due. The
extension does not operate as an extension to pay the taxes.
66 Fed. Reg. 38544 (July 25, 2001).
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FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The taxpayer owned and
operated an insulation installation business and claimed a
deduction for the entire cost of supplies received in 1994
even though some of the cost was paid in 1995. The taxpayer
marked the box on Schedule C to indicate that the taxpayer
used the cash method of accounting and reported income
based on that method. The IRS disallowed the portion of the
supply costs which were not paid in 1994. The taxpayer
argued that the taxpayer actually used the accrual method of
accounting but the court held that the information on
Schedule C was more consistent with the cash method;
therefore, the taxpayer was limited to deduct the expenses
actually paid in 1994. Woodlee v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary
Op. 2001-110.
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a corporation
which owned an aircraft. The corporation used the aircraft for
business purposes and allowed its corporate officers to use
the aircraft for personal purposes. The officers included the
value of the use of the jet in their gross income and the
taxpayer claimed the expenses for maintaining and using the
jet as business deductions. The IRS argued that, under I.R.C.
§ 274(a)(1), the business deductions were not allowed
because the aircraft was a facility used for entertainment.
Thus, the taxpayer would be allowed a deduction only for the
amounts determined to be deductible as compensation to the
officers. The taxpayer argued that I.R.C. § 274(e)(2) provided
an exception to section 274(a)(1) because the officers
included the value of the flights as compensation. The court
agreed with the taxpayer and allowed the deductions for the
maintenance and use of the jet. National Bancorp of Alaska,
Inc., T.C. Memo. 2001-203; Midland Financial Co. and
Subsidiaries, T.C. Memo. 2001-202.
The taxpayer, a dentist, claimed net losses from a horse
farm activity but provided no evidence to demonstrate the
existence of the horse business and did not provide any
substantiating evidence to support the deductions claimed on
Schedule F. The court held that the loss deduction would not
be allowed for the alleged horse activity. Beck v Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2001-198.
The taxpayer, an accountant, owned a partnership interest
in a horse breeding and racing operation. The taxpayer
claimed net operating losses in excess of basis for three tax
years before selling the interest in the horse operation. The
taxpayer carried the losses forward in each tax year. The IRS
disallowed the net loss carryforwards to the extent the losses
exceeded the taxpayer’s basis in the partnership. The court
held that the taxpayer could not deduct the excess
carryforward losses because the taxpayer presented no
evidence to support the losses or the claimed basis in the
partnership. Bendickson v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op.
2001-107.
CASUALTY LOSSES . The taxpayers suffered damage to
their residence from an earthquake in 1994. The taxpayers
sought federal and state assistance for the costs of repairing
the damage and received some money from FEMA but not
enough to cover all the repairs. The final appeal for the
disaster assistance was made in 1995, and in 1996 the
taxpayers used money borrowed from relatives to make the
repairs. The taxpayers claimed the cost of repairs above the
FEMA grant as a casualty loss in 1996, arguing that the loss
did not occur until the costs of repair were paid. The court
held that the casualty loss deduction is limited to the tax year
in which the casualty occurred; therefore, the taxpayers were
not entitled to a casualty loss deduction in 1996 for
earthquake damage that occurred in 1994. Without
explanation, the court also stated that the casualty loss
deduction could also have been taken in 1995 when the
FEMA appeals were completed. Randle v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summary Op. 2001-115.
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT OF INCOME . Under the
employees’ contract, employees could elect to receive money
in exchange for excess vacation days accrued during a
calendar year of employment.The IRS ruled that the right to
make the election did not constitute constructive receipt of
income and income would not be realized until the election
was made and the money paid. Ltr. Rul. 200130015, April
26, 2001).
CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.03.*
DISREGARD OF CORPORATE FORM. The taxpayer had
formed a corporation for a child identification business.
Although the business did not actually start operations, the
corporation entered into several agreements which were
sig ed by the taxpayer as an officer of the corporation. The
taxpayer claimed several business expenses on the taxpayer’s
personal Schedule C, resulting in net losses  for the tax year
involved. The taxpayer argued that the corporation did not
ever begin business operations and was not treated as a
separate entity by the taxpayer. The court held that the
business deductions belonged to the corporation and could
not be claimed on the taxpayer’s personal return because the
corporation was a legitimate business entity, had begun the
business operation and held out as a separate entity in its
business dealings. Cashman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-
199.
DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations which provide that the stock of a controlled
c rporation will not be qualified property under I.R.C. §§
355(c)(2) or 361(c)(2) if the stock is distributed as “part of a
plan (or series of related transactions) pursuant to which 1 or
more p rsons acquire directly or indirectly stock representing
a 50-p rcent or greater interest in the distributing corporation
or any controlled corporation.” The regulations provide
guidance concerning the interpretation of the phrase “plan (or
series of related transactions).” The regulations generally
provide that whether a distribution and an acquisition are part
of a plan is determined based on all the facts and
circumstances. The regulations also set forth six safe harbors,
the satisfaction of which would confirm that a distribution
and an acquisition are not part of a plan. 66 Fed. Reg. 40590
(Aug. 3, 2001).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14]. The taxpayer was asked to resign employment
becaus  the taxpayer was disabled by a motorcycle accident
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unrelated to the employment. The taxpayer sought payment
from the employer because the taxpayer alleged that the
employment termination violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The employer paid a settlement to the
taxpayer who did not file an ADA suit. The taxpayer failed to
provide any evidence to support an allocation of the
settlement among the possible ADA personal and
nonpersonal injury claims; therefore, the court held that the
entire settlement was included in income. Managan v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-192.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On June 21, 2001, the
President determined that certain areas in Pennsylvania were
eligible for assistance under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of
tropical storm Allison on June 15-17, 2001. FEMA-1383-
DR. On July 12, 2001, the President determined that certain
areas in Virginia were eligible for assistance under the Act as
a result of severe storms and flooding on July 8-10, 2001.
FEMA-1386-DR. Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a
loss attributable to the disasters may deduct the loss on his or
her 2000 federal income tax return.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer provided photographic
services to a business operated by the taxpayer and the
taxpayer’s father. Once it became clear that the father’s
business would cease, the taxpayer made efforts to increase
the income from the photography business. Although the
photography business at first produced seven years of losses,
the taxpayer had managed four straight years of net profits,
although some of the profit came from a small amount of
business with the father’s corporation. The court held that the
photography business was entered into with an intent to make
a profit because (1) the taxpayer maintained complete and
accurate records of the photography business, (2) had a
business plan which had eventually produced profits and
would continue to produce more profits in the future, (3) the
taxpayer spent a considerable amount of time in the business,
and (4) the taxpayer’s personal pleasure from photography
was a minor aspect of the business. The IRS raised an issue
on appeal which the court refused to rule on because the issue
was first raised in the brief: the IRS argued that the
photography business involved with the father’s business
should have been treated separately from the taxpayer’s
personal photography business, resulting in more years of
losses and greater losses. The court stated that, even if the
issue was properly raised, the businesses would be considered
as one because the nature of the businesses was very similar
and one grew out of the other. Tamms v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2001-201.
The taxpayers raised thoroughbred horses and claimed loss
deductions from the activity. The Tax Court held that the
dominant motive of the taxpayers in operating the activity
was the tax savings generated by the activity. The Tax Court
identified the taxpayers’ lack of experience and training in
horse breeding and excessive rental payments, but otherwise
failed to provide support for its holding. The appellate court
reversed in a decision designated as not for publication. The
appellate court acknowledged that a dominant tax savings
motive  could be inferred if the tax savings would exceed the
actual losses expected from the activity but stated that the
record was insufficient to demonstrate whether the tax
savings in this case exceeded the expected out-of-pocket
losses. The appellate court noted that a business had a
legitimat  ability to structure the business to produce the
maximum amount of tax savings. The case did not discuss
any of the other nine factors in Treas. Reg. 1.183-2(b).
Steinbrecher v. Comm’r, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,533 (9th Cir. 1993).
LETTER RULINGS. The IRS has announced that
technical advice will not be issued on frivolous issues. For
purposes of this program, a “frivolous issue” is one without
basis in fact or law, or that espouses a position which has
been held by the courts to be frivolous or groundless.
Exampl s of frivolous or groundless issues include, but are
not limited to:
(1) frivolous “constitutional” claims, such as claims that the
requirement to file tax returns and pay taxes constitutes an
unr aso able search barred by the Fourth Amendment;
violates Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections of due
process; violates Thirteenth Amendment protections against
involuntary servitude; or is unenforceable because the
Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize nonapportioned
direct taxes or was never ratified;
(2) claims that income taxes are voluntary, that the term
“income” is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code, or that
preparation and filing of income tax returns violates the
Paperwork Reduction Act;
(3) claims that tax may be imposed only on coins minted
under a gold or silver standard or that receipt of Federal
Reserve Notes does not cause an accretion to wealth;
(4) claims that a person is not taxable on income because he
or she falls within a class entitled to “reparation claims” or an
extra-statutory class of individuals exempt from tax, e.g.,
“free-born” individuals;
(5) claims that a taxpayer can refuse to pay taxes on the
basis of opposition to certain governmental expenditures;
(6) claims that taxes apply only to federal employees; only
to residents of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands,
the District of Columbia, or “federal enclaves”; or that the
Internal Revenue Code imposes taxes on U.S. citizens and
residents only on income derived from foreign based
activities;
(7) claims that wages or personal service income are not
“income,” are “nontaxable receipts,” or “are a nontaxable
exchange for labor;” or
(8) other claims the courts have characterized as frivolous
or groundless. Rev. Proc. 2001-41, I.R.B. 2001-__.
LEGAL FEES . The taxpayers owned a farm and had sued
the United States Army for injury to farm animals and the
taxpayer’s family from contamination of the water by nerve
agents. The suit sought personal injury damages and damages
for injury to real property. The taxpayer claimed deductions
for the legal fees in one tax year on Schedule F as business
expenses. The court acknowledged that the personal injury
damages would not be taxable; therefore, only the legal fees
attributable to the real property damage claim could be
deducted, because the damages would be included in income.
The taxpayer failed to provide evidence to support any
allocation of the possible damage award in order to allocate
the legal fees; however, the court held that it would allocate
$2,000 of the legal fees to the real property damage claim.
Land v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-111.
Agricultural Law Digest 127
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . The taxpayers entered into a
sale of real property using an accommodator to effect an
exchange of properties. The taxpayer used the accommodator
as a qualified intermediary to make use of the safe harbor
rules of Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4). The IRS ruled that
the accommodator was not a qualified intermediary because
(1) there was no actual transfer of the relinquished property
to the accommodator and (2) the taxpayers failed to give
notice to all parties of the assignment of the property to the
accommodator. The taxpayers argued that the purchasers had
actual notice of the assignment from the settlement
statements. The IRS ruled that the settlement statements were
not unequivocal in identifying the true relationship of the
taxpayer and the accommodator; therefore, the settlement
statements could not used to satisfy the notice requirements.
Thus, the IRS ruled that the transactions were not eligible for
like-kind exchange treatment. TAM Ltr. Rul. 200130001,
March 1, 2001.
PENALTIES . The taxpayer had invested in a Jojoba
growing partnership which was determined by the IRS to be
ineligible for research and development deductions and other
tax deductions. The taxpayer was assessed a deficiency after
the taxpayer’s share of the disallowed deductions was also
disallowed. The issue in this case was whether the taxpayer
was also liable for the negligence and substantial
understatement of tax penalties. The court found that the
taxpayer did not consult knowledgeable income tax advisors
or agricultural experts before investing in the partnership in
order to determine whether the investments and tax benefits
were reasonable. Therefore, the court held that the taxpayer
was liable for the negligence penalty. The court also held that
the taxpayer was liable for the substantial understatement of
tax penalty because the taxpayer had no authority for the
deductions taken and did not fully disclose the investments
on the tax returns. Serfustini v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-
183.
S CORPORATIONS
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayers were siblings and
their spouses who owned all the stock of an S corporation
which operated a produce handling business. Two
shareholders purchased improved real estate and leased it to
the corporation. These shareholders also borrowed money
from a third party creditor, used a portion of the money to
pay off the property loan, and contributed the remainder of
the loan to the corporation. The corporation was a signatory
on the loan. The court held that the shareholders could
increase their basis in the corporation by the amount of the
loan contributed to the corporation because the shareholders
made payments on the loan.  Cox v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2001-196.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. In a case involving tax law prior
to passage of the repeal of I.R.C. § 1034, the taxpayers sold
their previous residence for a gain in December 1991 and
purchased a new residence for an amount less than the gain in
May 1992. The taxpayers immediately began to plan and
begin construction of a detached addition to the new
residence. However, two years after the sale of the first
house, the new addition was not in livable condition. The
taxpayers had still not moved into the new addition over 6
years after beginning construction. The court held that the
c nstruction costs of the addition could not be added to the
purchase price of the second residence for purposes of I.R.C.
§ 1034; herefore, the taxpayers were not eligible for rollover
of the gain from the sale of the first house. The appellate
court ffirmed in a decision designated as not for publication.
Parker v. Comm’r, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,528
(9th Cir. 2001), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1999-347.
WITHHOLDING TAXES . The IRS has announced a
reduction in the backup withholding rate authorized by I.R.C.
§ 3406(a)(1). Section 101(c)(10) of the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-
16) reduced the rate for backup withholding on reportable
payments. Ann. 2001-80, I.R.B. 2001-31, 98.
PRODUCT LIABILITY
PESTICIDE . The plaintiff was injured by contact with a
register d pesticide manufactured by the defendant. The
pesticide label had several warnings against any skin, eye, or
lu g contact with the pesticide by humans or animals. The
product was purchased by the plaintiff’s parent and placed in
an unlabeled spray bottle. The plaintiff sprayed the pesticide
onto horses before the plaintiff rode them. The plaintiff
alleged that the plaintiff came in contact with the pesticide
during the application of the pesticide and during the riding.
The plai tiff provided expert evidence that the contact with
the pesticide caused the plaintiff’s injury. The plaintiff filed
suit und r theories of failure to warn, negligence, breach of
express warranty, and strict liability. All of the causes of
ction were based on the same allegation that the defendant
failed to provide some warning that the pesticide was not
suitable for use on horses. The court held that all of the
causes of action were preempted by FIFRA because they
were based on the failure of the label to warn against the use
of the pesticide on horses. The court acknowledged that the
strict liability action could conceivably be based on other
factors which would not be preempted by FIFRA; however,
the plaintiff’s own expert evidence demonstrated that the
pesticide was not defective in design, manufactured or
labeled use. Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 140 F. Supp.2d
1011 (D. Minn. 2001).
CITATION UPDATES
Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001),
aff’g on point, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (N.D. Ala. 2000)
(court awards and settlements) see p. 85 supra.
Estate of Mitchell v. Comm’r, 250 F.3d 696 (9th Cir.
2001), rev’g in part, T.C. Memo. 1997-461 (estate valuation
of stock) see p. 84 supra.
Est. of Simplot v. Comm’r, 249 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.
2001), rev’g in part, 112 T.C. 130 (1999) (estate valuation of
stock) see p. 86 supra.
Hillman v. Comm’r, 250 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001), rev’g,
114 T.C. 103 (2000) (passive losses) see p. 78 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
P.O. Box 5 0 7 0 3Eugene, OR 97405
128
The Agricultural Law Press presents
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINAR
FEATURING DISCUSSION OF EGTRRA 2001   
    by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
October 2-5, 2001
Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminar are held on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four
days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On
Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and
ranch business planning. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several other areas of
agricultural law. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended which
will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional
charge. A buffet lunch and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities,
self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Farm estate planning, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), marital deduction planning, disclaimers,
planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
Special room discounted rates are available at the hotel for seminar attendees.
The seminar registration fees   for current subscribers    (and for multiple registrations from one firm) to the Agricultural
Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law are $180 (one day), $345 (two days), $500
(three days), and $650 (four days).  The registration fees for    n subscribers   are $200, $385, $560 and $720, respectively.
Please Note: the registration fees are higher for registrations within 7 days prior to the seminar, so please call for
availability and the correct fees. More information and a registration form are available online at www. grilawpress.com
For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to robert@agrilawpress.com
